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1 Introduction
In a speculative bubble, trade occurs at prices above fundamentals only be-
cause investors expect the selling price to be even higher in the near future
(Stiglitz, 1990). Trading activities based on speculative motives seem wide-
spread and have been widely documented (see Garber, 1990; Kindleberger,
2005), but their foundation remains largely unclear. As purely speculative
trade must rely on some inconsistent expectations or suboptimal decisions,
it cannot arise in standard rational expectation models (Tirole, 1982).
In this paper, we show that speculative bubbles may be explained by
considering that a fraction of investors have a partial rather than total un-
derstanding of the investment strategies employed by other investors. Specif-
ically, in our model, all investors understand the aggregate buying and selling
pressures that apply on average throughout the entire duration of the mar-
ket. But, while some investors also understand how these buying and selling
pressures precisely depend on the history of trade (these are fully rational
traders), others lack such precise knowledge (these are partially sophisti-
cated traders). As a result, some investors form erroneous beliefs about
the date of the crash, and they are not able to sell just before it, thereby
allowing bubbles and crashes to occur.
Before we present in more detail the features of our model and their
implications, we make two observations about bubbles, which will also allow
us to explain how our approach di¤ers from other approaches.1
The rst observation is that assuming information about fundamentals is
dispersed among traders is neither necessary nor su¢ cient for the emergence
of bubbles. From a theory viewpoint, private information alone cannot ex-
plain bubbles, as can be inferred from the no-trade theorems (Milgrom and
Stokey, 1982). From an experimental viewpoint, there is substantial evi-
dence that bubbles emerge even in contexts in which by design the structure
of the game and the value of future dividends are commonly known to sub-
jects (see Porter and Smith, 2003, for a review). Such an observation leads
us to consider a model with complete information in which the structure
of fundamentals is commonly known but traders are heterogeneous in their
ability to understand otherstrading strategies.
The second observation is that it seems highly plausible, at least in late
stages of a bubble, that most agents would be aware that they are in a
speculative market. There are anecdotes about this2, and more systematic
survey evidence. Shiller (1989), for example, reports that just before the
1More precise references to the literature on bubbles are provided in Section 5.1.
2For example, Eric Janszen, a leading commentator of speculative phenomena, wrote
an article in the middle of the Internet bubble (November 1999) saying: "During the nal
stages, the mania participants nally admit that they are in a mania. But they rationalize
that its OK because they  only they and not the other participants will get out in
time." (article accessible at www.bankrate.com)
2
U.S. stock market crash of October 1987, 84% of institutional investors
thought that the market was overpriced; 78% of them thought that this
belief was shared by the rest of investors and, still, 93% of them were net
buyers. Such an observation calls in our view for a new modelling of bounded
rationality, allowing (at least a fraction of) agents to have some but not
full understanding of the situation. In most existing approaches, agents
are assumed to be either fully rational, thereby, in equilibrium, having a
complete understanding of the market dynamics, or completely mechanical,
and so lacking any understanding that they are in a bubble and that the
market may crash. By contrast, in our model, it is common knowledge
among agents that they are in a bubble and that the market must crash. At
the same time, bubbles are sustained as agents believe, rightly or wrongly,
that they can prot by investing in the speculative market and exiting at
the right time.
We now describe a bit more precisely our framework. We consider a
market in which agents can trade an asset with no fundamental value. Trade
can occur only for a nite number of periods, as liquidity shocks force a
(small) fraction of agents to leave the market in each period. Investors
are either fully rational or partially sophisticated. Partially sophisticated
investors understand the aggregate buy and sell rates along the duration of
the speculative market, without having a precise perception of how these
rates vary along the life-cycle of the bubble. Moreover, they adopt the
simplest theory of trade volumes and price dynamics that is compatible with
their knowledge, thereby expecting constant buy and sell rates throughout
the duration of the speculative market, independently from the history of
trades.3 In equilibrium, these constant rates match the aggregate intensities
averaged over time, as resulting from the actual sell and buy strategies. In
each period, based on their expectations, agents make the optimal trading
decisions.
Before previewing our main results, let us emphasize that this equilib-
rium is not, in our view, the result of individual learning, whereby the same
group of investors repeatedly acts in the same market, since in this case
partially sophisticated investors would probably either learn they get ex-
ploited or run out of money. We think instead of a process of learning at an
historical level, in which a new population of investors enters the market in
each bubble episode. These investors interpret the current market in light
of some historical data about similar episodes. Partially sophisticated in-
vestors, however, analyze these data with a simplied model, able to provide
3This may echo the observation that the date of the crash tends to appear quite similar
to many other days. Investors and analysts typically nd it hard to understand in what
sense that precise day was so special, and fundamentally di¤erent from the previous day.
Even the systematic analysis by Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989) concludes that
"many of the largest market movements in recent years have occurred on days when there
were no major news events."
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the correct averages but not more detailed statistics.4 In a sense, they apply
a linear model to analyze trade dynamics that are not necessarily linear (as
in the spirit of Sargent, 1993).
In our analysis, we rst characterize optimal investment strategies. In
line with the view that investments during bubbles are driven by short-
term speculation rather than by fundamentals (Stiglitz, 1990), we show that
such strategies are based only on investorsexpectations about the market
dynamics one period ahead. These expectations in turn depend on investors
knowledge about past bubble episodes and on the behaviors observed during
the current bubble episode. Hence, similarly to the experimental evidence
presented in Haruvy, Lahav and Noussair (2007), investors beliefs about
future market dynamics can be represented as a simple function of historical
and current trends.
We then characterize the structure of equilibrium bubbles and crashes
emerging in our framework. The bubble displays rst a phase of rising
prices, due to excess demand for speculative stocks. Boundedly rational in-
vestors interpret such high prices as good news, they are induced to trade in
the speculative market, and to remain invested even longer than they had
originally planned.5 The speculative market is sustained by such increasing
euphoria, which leads boundedly rational investors to eventually overesti-
mate the duration of the bubble (as emphasized in Kindleberger, 2005).
On the other hand, fully rational investors feed the bubble for a while and
exit just before the endogenous crash (as documented in Brunnermeier and
Nagel, 2004 and Temin and Voth, 2004). Observing the massive sale by
rational investors, boundedly rational investors realize it is time to sell (ac-
tually, it may be too late), and this indeed leads to the crash. In this way,
our framework generates both bubbles and crashes, phenomena which tend
to be considered separately in the literature.
Finally, we characterize the conditions for the existence and maximal
duration of bubbles as a function of our parameters. In particular, we ex-
plore the relation between bubbles and the share of rational investors in the
market. We observe that rational investors should be neither too many nor
too few for bubble equilibria to arise with the property that, just before
the crash, there is a panic phase in which investors realize everyone is try-
ing to sell and the crash is about to occur.6 We also observe in our basic
model that when there are more rational investors the maximal duration of
4For example, these averages may be easier to understand and remember than more
detailed information about say the daily buy and sell rates.
5This captures a strong regularity documented in Shiller (2000). As the price increases,
more people display "bubble expectations", i.e. the belief that, despite the market being
overvalued, it will still increase for a while before the crash.
6With too many rational agents, bubbles cannot arise because we are too close to a
rational expectation model. With too few rational agents, boundedly rational traders do
not observe any massive sale before the crash occurs and as a result they do not get to
understand that the crash is about to occur before it actually does.
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a bubble gets smaller. However, by extending our analysis to a setting with
uncertainty aversion, we show that bubbles may last longer as the fraction
of rational investors increases.7 Thus, in our setting, whether rational in-
vestors have a stabilizing role depends on the attitude of investors toward
uncertainty.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe
the model and the solution concept. In Section 3 we analyze bubble equi-
libria. In Section 4 we explore whether rational agents have a stabilizing
role. In Section 5 we discuss some related literature, policy implications,
and avenues for future research. In the Appendix we provide the proofs and
some generalizations of our results.
2 The model
Our economy is populated by a unit mass of risk neutral individuals.8 Ini-
tially, a fraction K of them is endowed with cash, each owning w > 0; and
a fraction (1   K) is endowed with stocks, each owning one stock. Cash
and stocks are distributed independently across agents. The value of cash
is constant over time. Stocks are purely speculative: they pay no dividend,
their fundamental value is zero, and their return is given only by changes
in the price pt. For simplicity, we assume that each agent can hold at most
one stock at a time, and each stock is indivisible.9
2.1 Financial market
In each period t = 1; 2; :::, individuals can trade. Within each period t, trad-
ing occurs as follows: individuals decide simultaneously whether to submit
their orders, a market clearing price pt is announced, and orders are cleared.
Borrowing stocks or cash is not allowed, so the investment option for
individual i in period t is simply fbuy; stay outg if i holds cash at t; or
fsell; stay ing if i holds a stock at t. In addition, in case he submits a trade
order, each individual species a maximum price pbt at which he is willing to
buy or a minimum price pst at which he is willing to sell. Such reserve prices
will ensure that demand and supply are smooth functions of the price.
While individual decisions on whether or not to submit a trade order are
endogenously determined in equilibrium, for simplicity we leave reservation
7 In fact, facing less strategic uncertainty, rational agents are more prone to invest than
boundedly rational ones. As the share of rational investors increases, more people enter the
speculative market, which may induce boundedly rational agents to be more optimistic,
thereby allowing to sustain longer bubbles.
8Section 4.3 considers the case of uncertainty averse agents.
9The substance of our analysis would not change if stocks were perfectly divisible and
everyone could spend his entire wealth in stocks. The crucial assumption, as we shall see,
is that the entire economy has nite wealth.
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prices exogenous. For each individual, these prices write as pst = pt 1
and pbt = pt 1 + (1  )w; where the parameter  is drawn independently
across individuals from a commonly known distribution with smooth density
and support on [0; 1].10 The induced distributions of reservation prices for
those agents who may sell or buy a stock in period t are described by the
cumulative functions  t and t; respectively. These distributions depend on
the history of trades, but from the above assumption their support always
lies respectively in [0; pt 1] and in [pt 1; w].
The market clearing price pt can be characterized in every period t
as follows. Denote the amount of buy and sell orders at t by Bt and St,
respectively: These quantities can be written as
Bt = tKt and St = t(1 K); (1)
where Kt denotes the amount of people who can buy a stock, t the share
of those who want to buy, and t the share of those who want to sell in
period t.11 If Bt  St; the price pt solves Bt[1  t(pt)] = St; which implies
t(pt)  0 and so pt  pt 1: If instead Bt < St; the price pt solves Bt =
St[1   t(pt)]; which implies  t(pt) > 0 and so pt < pt 1: Hence, we have
pt  pt 1 , Bt  St: (2)
Finally, we assume that, at the end of each period t, each agent observes the
trading price pt and the volume of trade Vt = minfBt; Stg, from which he
can correctly infer Bt and St: In what follows, we refer to Bt and St simply
as demand and supply in period t.
2.2 Exit from the market
While the amount of stocks is xed to (1 K) throughout the analysis, the
amount of people who can buy stocks changes over time due to the exit of
some investors. We dene exit from the speculative market in period t as
the sum of stock-holders who sell and cash-holders who decide not to buy
in period t. That is, the amount of exit in period t is
Et = Vt + (1  t)Kt: (3)
Selling may either be deliberate or it may be induced by a liquidity shock,
which forces some agents to sell the stock immediately and stay out of the
10A fully specied model may derive such  from heterogeneous preferences, regarding
for example attitudes towards risk.
11These rates are in principle the realization of a random variable that aggregates the
strategies of every agent at a given point in time. However, since we consider a setting with
a continuum of agents, each realization of such variable corresponds to its expected value.
Accordingly, in what follows, we simplify the notation and ignore the distinction between
the expected values of these quantities in a given period and their actual realizations.
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market from then on.12 An agent with stock may be hit by a shock with
probability z > 0; thus the amount of exogenous exit in each period is
z(1 K), where we assume that z(1 K) < K:13
In equilibrium, agents who decide to exit the speculative market never
wish to re-enter, and we assume that this is rightly understood by every-
body.14 Accordingly, the amount of people who can buy a stock at t evolves
as
Kt+1 = Kt   Et; (4)
and, by equation (3), we have
Kt+1 = tKt   Vt: (5)
From equation (5), it follows that the price pt never recovers after having
dropped. If in period t the price drops, it must be due to excess supply in
t, in which case the volume of trade Vt is equal to the demand tKt and
equation (5) yields Kt+1 = 0. By equation (4), Kt can only decrease over
time, which implies that Kt+s = 0 for all s  1: Thus, after a price drop,
the market closes.
2.3 Cognitive abilities and equilibrium
Agents di¤er in their ability to understand other agentstrading strategies.
An agents type  determines his expectation about the dynamics of trade
volumes and the associated prices. Such dynamics depend on demand and
supply in each period, which in turn depend on the amount of agents still
active in the market together with their buy and sell strategies.
From denition (1), the period s expectations for an agent of type 
about the demand and supply in period t are given by
B;st = 
;s
t K
;s
t and S
;s
t = 
;s
t (1 K) for every s  t; (6)
where ;st and 
;s
t are this agents expected buy and sell rates, and K
;s
t is
the expected amount of traders in the market at t: In order to estimate the
latter, agents need to know how many traders are in the market at s; and
how many exit from s to t 1. Recall that, in period s, agents have observed
the history of prices and trade volumes, by which they can correctly infer
the amount of exits until s  1 and so Ks: Hence,
K;ss = Ks; for every  and s.
12Such shocks should not be confused with noise trade. They are simply to avoid the
possibility that the speculative market lasts forever.
13Assuming, perhaps more naturally, that everyone may be hit by a liquidity shock
would not change our results, but it would complicate their derivation.
14 In Section 7.1 in the Appendix, we show that, under a (natural) assumption, this is
the only consistent case.
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For t > s; using equation (4), we have
K;st = Ks  
w=t 1X
w=s
E;sw ; (7)
where, by equation (3),
E;sw = min(B
;s
w ; S
;s
w ) + (1  ;sw )K;sw : (8)
Given equations (6), (7) and (8), an agents expectations about future
market dynamics are completely characterized by his expectations about
future buy and sell rates. These expectations depend on the agents type,
as we now describe. For simplicity, we consider a setting with only two
cognitive types: standard rational agents R and boundedly rational agents
I, in proportion r and (1  r), respectively.
R-types understand perfectly well the patterns of other investorsstrate-
gies. Hence, if the actual buy and sell rates arising in equilibrium in period
t are given by t and t, R-agentsexpectations must satisfy
R;st = t and 
R;s
t = t for every s  t: (9)
I-agents, instead, expect constant buy and sell rates throughout the duration
of the speculative market, where these rates coincide with the actual average
rates that prevail throughout the speculative market. Formally, denote with
T +1 the last date in which the speculative market operates, as determined
endogenously in equilibrium. The average buy rate  and the average sell
rate  for the sequence of buy and sell decisions arising in equilibrium are
 =
1
T + 1
T+1X
t=1
t and  =
1
T + 1
T+1X
t=1
t: (10)
I-typesexpectations are required to correspond to such averages, hence we
have
I;st =
 and I;st =  for every s  t: (11)
We rst note that I-agents hold I;st and 
I;s
t constant irrespective of the
histories of trade. For example, they may think of these rates as resulting
from a given distribution of strategies, of which they know only the mean.
In this way, even when observing a realization di¤erent from the mean, they
need not change their theory about the underlying distribution.15
15We also prefer having in mind that I-agents are not aware that other investors may
have a more accurate understanding of the market dynamics. Otherwise, given that in
our model trades mostly occur for speculative reasons, I-agents may simply decide to stay
outside the market if they realize to be less sophisticated than others. Such a conclusion
would be altered if all agents thought that some other agents are less sophisticated than
they are. We leave the extension of our model to the case of innitely many cognitive
types (that would allow for this) for future research.
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Investment decisions are determined as the optimal investment strategies
given these expectations and agentspayo¤s, which are dened as follows.
The payo¤ of an agent is zero if he holds cash or stock forever; (ps pt) if he
buys a stock at time t and he sells it at time s; ps if he initially owns a stock
and sells it at s; and  pt if he buys a stock at t and keeps it forever.16 After
each history of prices and trade volumes, each agent chooses an investment
strategy that maximizes his expected payo¤. An investment strategy prole
species an investment strategy for every agent in the economy, which serves
to dene an equilibrium in our setting.
Denition 1 (Equilibrium): An investment strategy prole is an equi-
librium if, all along the equilibrium path, each agents investment strategy
maximizes his expected payo¤, given the expectations dened in equations
(9) and (11).
Our denition of equilibrium is in the spirit of the rational expectation
equilibrium in which, due to the dynamic nature of the interaction, beliefs
and investment strategies must be optimally adjusted at every point in time.
Note however that our denition only considers the incentives of agents on
the equilibrium path, and not the adjustment of beliefs and strategies after
a positive mass of agents have made non-equilibrium decisions.17
3 Analysis
3.1 Optimal investment strategies
We focus on symmetric equilibria in pure strategies, where all investors of
a given type and with a given endowment in period t follow the same pure
strategy. Observe rst that the existence of an equilibrium is not an issue,
as there is always the non-bubble equilibrium in which every agent exits the
speculative market at the very rst period.18 Our interest lies in showing the
possibility of bubble equilibria, and characterizing the conditions for such
equilibria to exist. Given that the fundamental value of the asset is zero,
we dene any situation in which trade occurs as a bubble. Conversely, if at
16For an agent hit by a liquidity shock, payo¤s may be described di¤erently. For exam-
ple, such agent may only care about immediate cash, and place no value on cash in the
future.
17While one could easily amend the solution concept to cover o¤-the-path optimizations
and expectations, this would make the notation heavier (in particular, the state variable
parameterizing the decisions should no longer be the calendar time t but the entire his-
tory of buy/sell decisions) without adding much economic insight. Moreover, since each
individual agent has a negligible weight (there is a continuum of agents), our notion of
equilibrium is in the spirit of the Nash equilibrium, where no single agent can on his own
move the system away from the equilibrium path.
18 In this equilibrium, I-agents expectations are correct, and their decisions to exit
immediately is thus rational.
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some point no one is willing to buy the stock at any price, the speculative
market closes. Provided that some trade had occurred, we then say that
there is crash.
The problem faced by an individual of a given type is the same irre-
spective of whether he has cash or stock. That is, for any agent i 2  with
cash and any agent j 2  with stock (who is not hit by a liquidity shock),
i prefers to buy if and only if j prefers to stay in, and i prefers to stay out
if and only if j prefers to sell. Intuitively, trade occurs either among people
with di¤erent needs, as described by the liquidity sellers z, or among those
with di¤erent expectations, as described by the di¤erent types.
In principle, investment strategies may be very complicated, since each
agent may condition his current strategy on the whole history of past trades
and on his own past trading decisions. However, as it turns out, our model
allows a very simple representation of optimal trading strategies. We start
by showing that, expecting all exits from the market to be permanent, no
agent wishes to re-enter after having exited, and so equation (4) is indeed
consistent with equilibrium behaviors.
Lemma 1 Expecting exits to be permanent, an agent who exits the specu-
lative market at t prefers to stay out from then on.
Proof. See Section 6.1 in the Appendix.
As noticed after equation (5), the fact that exits are permanent implies
that the price never recovers after having dropped. As a result, optimal
trading strategies at time t can be expressed as a function of the expected
prices at t and at t+ 1 only. We state the result in the next Proposition.
Proposition 1 An agent i 2  prefers to buy/stay in the market at t if and
only if
p;tt+1  p;tt ; (12)
or, equivalently, if and only if
B;tt+1  S;tt+1: (13)
Proof. See Section 6.2 in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 allows us to write the optimal investment strategy for I-
agents in any period t simply as a function of the observed amount of people
who can buy at t and of the constant expectation about future buy and sell
rates. We express this more precisely in the next Corollary.
Corollary 1 An agent i 2 I prefers to buy/stay in the market at t if and
only if
Kt W; (14)
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where
W  (1 K)(1 +
)
2
: (15)
Proof. See Section 6.3 in the Appendix.
In sum, at any t, optimal trading strategies for I-agents are only a func-
tion of Kt; which describes the history of trades, and of the expectation
about future buy and sell rates, as expressed in equation (15). Such ex-
pectation, in turn, depends on the equilibrium duration of the bubble; but
it remains constant over time. R-agentsexpectation, instead, reects the
true strategies observed along the equilibrium, and so it may vary with t:
In particular, given equation (13), these agents buy/stay in the market in
period t if and only if t+1Kt+1  t+1(1 K):
3.2 Bubble equilibria
We can now show that, under conditions to be characterized in the next
Subsection, there exist equilibria of the following form. Apart from a share
z of stock-holders who sell in each period due to liquidity shocks, investors
strategies are such that in each period t  T   1 everyone tries to enter the
speculative market and no one wants to sell; in period T , I-investors buy
and R-investors sell; at T + 1; everyone tries to sell but no one is willing to
buy. The crash then occurs and the market closes. Along these equilibria,
called bubble equilibria, the aggregate buy and sell rates are
t =
8<:
1 for t  T   1;
1  r for t = T;
0 for t = T + 1;
(16)
and
t =
8<:
z for t  T   1;
z + r(1  z) for t = T;
1 for t = T + 1:
(17)
According to equation (10), I-agents are induced to expect the following
buy and sell rates:
 =
T   r
T + 1
; (18)
and
 =
Tz + r(1  z) + 1
T + 1
: (19)
This allows us to dene B;ts and S
;t
s according to equations (6), (7), and
(8). Besides, given the above specications, the only variable remaining to
endogenize is the duration T of the bubble. A major objective of the next
11
analysis is then to characterize the conditions for the existence of such T;
and to understand how T depends on our exogenous parameters K; z and r:
Given that the exits from the speculative market are permanent, if i
wants to sell/stay out at t; then he wants to sell/stay out for every s > t:
Likewise, if i wants to buy/stay in the market at t; this reveals that he
wanted to buy/stay in the market at each s < t: Hence, the equilibrium T is
dened simply by three conditions. First, each agent i 2 R has to prefer to
buy at T   1; so we must have pT > pT 1: By equation (13), this condition
writes as
BT  ST : (20)
Second, each agent i 2 I has to prefer to buy at T; which, by equation (14),
writes as
KT W: (21)
Third, each agent i 2 I has to prefer to sell at T + 1; which, again using
equation (14), writes as
KT+1 < W: (22)
The last two conditions also imply that each agent i 2 R prefers to sell at T;
since given I-agentsbehavior, the market crashes at T + 1: We summarize
these observations in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 Any T satisfying conditions (20), (21) and (22) can be sus-
tained as a bubble equilibrium.
3.2.1 Example
While we postpone a more detailed analysis of conditions (20), (21) and
(22) to Section 6.4 in the Appendix, we now highlight their structure with
a numerical example. Suppose that z = 0:2; r = 0:2 and K = 0:9.
In Figure 1, the solid curve is the function W (T ), the solid line is the
function F (T ) = K z(1 K)(T 1), the dashed line is the function G(T ) =
(1  r)[K   z(1 K)T ]  r(1 K). F (T ) and G(T ) map the equilibrium T
with the amount of investors who can buy in period T and T+1, respectively.
These functions are derived in Section 6.4, and, by construction, they are
such that F (T ) = KT and G(T ) = KT+1. The vertical line plots T = T1; as
derived from condition (20). In this example, condition (20) is satised for
T  T1; condition (21) for T  T2; as dened by the intersection of W (T )
and F (T ); and condition (22) for T > T3; as dened by the intersection of
W (T ) and G(T ): Specically, substituting our values in equations (20), (21)
and (22) we nd that, up to integer approximations, they require respectively
T  42; T  43; and T  41: Hence, any T 2 [41; 42] can be a bubble
equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Conditions dening the equilibrium bubble for z=0.2, r=0.2 and K=0.9.
3.3 Existence and maximal duration of a bubble equilibrium
We now ask ourselves when a T  1 satisfying conditions (20), (21) and
(22) exists as a function of the parameters K, z and r: When such T exists,
we say that a bubble equilibrium exists. Intuitively, a bubble is more likely
to develop when there is a large amount of cash that could potentially be
used to fuel it; when not too many people are hit by shocks that force them
to exit the speculative market, and when the number of investors who can
correctly predict the date of the crash is not too large. We express this in
the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 There exists a K(r; z) < 1 such that if K  K(r; z); then
a bubble equilibrium exists. Such minimal K(r; z) increases in r and z.
Proof. See Section 6.5 in the Appendix.
As shown in the previous example, and more generally in Section 6.4,
there need not be only one T satisfying conditions (20), (21) and (22). One
natural point of interest is the largest T that can be sustained in equilibrium,
the one maximizing R-agentsprots.
Such largest T is dened by conditions (20) and (21). The rst condition
can be explained recalling that, even if no one exits voluntarily from the
market, a mass z(1   K) of agents sells in each period due to liquidity
shocks. Hence, given that the mass of potential buyers decreases over time,
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R-agents cannot exit too late if they want to nd enough I-agents who buy
their stocks. Condition (20) can be written as
T  K   r
z(1 K)(1  r)  T1: (23)
Condition (21) instead imposes an upper bound on T whereby, if R-agents
sell too late, I-agents would not buy since the amount of cash observed at
that stage would be too low. Such an upper bound is dened by
T  T2;
where T2 is the largest root solvingK z(1 K)(T 1) =W (T ): (see Section
6.4 for details.) Accordingly, we dene the longest bubble equilibrium as
Tmax  minfT1; T2g:
In order to investigate how Tmax varies with our exogenous parameters, the
rst issue is under which conditions T1 or T2 is the constraint dening Tmax:
As shown in Section 6.6, when the fraction of rational agents r is small, the
latter constraint binds, while the opposite occurs when z or K are small.
Irrespective of this, however, the comparative statics are clear: both T1 and
T2 increase in K and decrease in r and z; as we show in the next Proposition.
Proposition 4 The maximal equilibrium bubble Tmax increases in K and
decreases with z and r: Moreover, Tmax !1 as K ! 1 or z ! 0:
Proof. See Section 6.7 in the Appendix.
Propositions 3 and 4 show that bubbles are supported by large K, small
z and small r: These relations are consistent with empirical evidence. The
e¤ect of a large K is in line with the observation that speculative stocks tend
to be initially in short supply, and that bubbles are sustained by the large
involvement of new investors (see Cochrane, 2002; Kindleberger, 2005). A
small probability of shock z implies that the fraction of potential investors
decreases slowly, which is consistent with the fact that bubbles tend to
display slow booms and sudden crashes (see Veldkamp, 2005). Finally, the
e¤ect of a small r echoes the observation that bubble episodes tend to attract
a large number of inexperienced investors (see Shleifer, 2000; Kindleberger,
2005). However, as we discuss in the next Section, the relation between
bubbles and rationality is not so clear-cut, once we allow for ambiguity
aversion.
4 Bubbles and rationality
In this Section, we discuss further how the existence and the structure of a
bubble equilibrium vary with the share of rational agents in the market.
14
4.1 Rational investors should not be too many
As in standard models, we cannot have bubbles if all investors are fully
rational. In particular, in a bubble equilibrium, r has to be small enough so
that all rational agents are able to sell at T: This condition denes T1; as
expressed in equation (23): As we must have T1  1; we need
r  K   z(1 K)
1  z(1 K)  rmax:
Hence, we can dene a necessary condition for the existence of a bubble
equilibrium.
Proposition 5 If r > rmax; then no bubble equilibrium exists.
4.2 Rational investors should not be too few
As expressed in Proposition 3, bubbles are more likely to arise when the share
of rational investors r is low. On the other hand, in the bubble equilibrium
characterized above, rational investors play a key role. By exiting at T ,
they give a negative shock to the market, which makes I-investors aware
that they had overestimated the length of the bubble and that the crash is
about to occur. As a result, I-investors rush to sell as they realize everyone
else is trying to sell. Such nal panic phase is a rather common feature of
market crashes (see Kindleberger, 2005), and we now show that it requires
r to be not too small.
Specically, consider the following condition:
BI;T+1T+1 < S
I;T+1
T+1 ; (24)
which ensures that, at the beginning of T+1; just before the crash occurs, all
investors expect the crash to occur next. Together with condition (21), this
requires that I-investorsexpectation about the date of the crash changes
between period T and period T + 1; which in turns requires that some bad
shock occurs in period T: Since the only source of such bad shocks is that
R-investors decide to exit, we need su¢ ciently many of them. We can state
this more precisely with the following Proposition.
Proposition 6 In a bubble equilibrium where I-agents, at the beginning of
T + 1; realize that the market will indeed burst at T + 1, we must have
r > rmin;
where rmin is implicitly dened by the condition Trmin = 1:
Proof. See Section 6.8 in the Appendix.
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4.3 Uncertainty Aversion
Proposition 4 shows that bubbles are more likely to last longer when the
fraction of rational investors is smaller. We now show that this need not be
the case if we consider a setting with uncertainty averse agents.19
In our model, uncertainty concerns solely the predictions of what other
investors do. Hence, the amount of uncertainty faced by each agent de-
pends on his ability to understand other investors equilibrium strategies.
If some I-agent perceives enough uncertainty, and he prefers to avoid it, he
may refrain from investing in the speculative market. On the other hand,
since fully rational agents face no uncertainty, they may be more willing to
invest. As a result, the amount of investors in the speculative market is
in general increasing with the share of rational agents. This in turn may
induce more optimistic expectations and higher demand, thereby allowing
to sustain longer bubbles.
In order to formally illustrate this idea, we enrich our setting by assum-
ing that, independently from their cognitive types, investors di¤er in their
attitudes towards ambiguity. Such attitudes however are not relevant for
R-investors, since as noted they face no ambiguity. For I-investors, instead,
we distinguish between ambiguity averse investors H and ambiguity neutral
investors L; which have mass (1 r)h and (1 r)(1 h) respectively. Admit-
ting that their predictions can be mistaken by some ", H-agents believe that,
in every t, the actual buy rate t will be in the interval [  "; +"]\[0; 1] and
the actual sell rate t will be in the interval [  "; + "]\ [0; 1].20 Further-
more, these agents consider the worst realizations of t and t; and, given
that, they choose the optimal investment strategy.21 Hence, in order to be
part of speculation, they require a return which compensates the perceived
uncertainty.22 Investors of type L are instead neutral towards uncertainty.
(or, alternatively, they do not admit that their predictions can be mistaken.)
Hence, as in Section 2, such investors only consider the averages  and :
While Section 7.3 in the Appendix provides a more general treatment,
we here consider the special case of z ! 0. In this case, Tmax is dened by
19Uncertainty (or equivalently ambiguity) describes situations where agentsperceptions
need not be accurate enough to provide them with a unique probability measure over the
possible states of the world.
20The error term " is here taken as given. One could for example endogenize this interval
by letting the expected t and t lie between the minimum and the maximum buy and
sell rates observed along the equilibrium.
21Formally, we are assuming that these investors have a set of probability measures over
the possible realizations of t and t: Investors compute the minimal expected payo¤s
conditional on each possible prior, and decide the investment strategy corresponding to
the maximum of such payo¤s. This idea, which may be thought as an extreme form of
uncertainty aversion, was formalized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
22 Indeed, many authors have invoked ambiguity aversion as a possible resolution of
the Equity Premium Puzzle (Chen and Epstein, 2002; Klibano¤, Marinacci and Mukerji,
2005).
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T1; which may increase in r since a higher r reduces the mass of ambiguity
averse agents in the market. In fact, the bubble equilibrium is such that
H-agents exit at some ~T , by selling to L- and to R-agents; R-agents sell
to L-agents in period T > ~T ; and in period T + 1 the crash occurs. The
smaller the mass of H-agents, the smaller is the amount of investors who
buy stocks at ~T ; and so the fewer are R-investors with stocks at T and the
more are L-investors with cash at T . Hence, the lower is ST and the higher
is BT ; which pushes towards an higher Tmax: This result is expressed in the
following Proposition.
Proposition 7 If z ! 0; there exists a r^(K;h) < 1 such that Tmax increases
in r for every r  r^:
Proof. See Section 7.2.1 in the Appendix.
5 Discussion
In this Section, we review some of our key ingredients in relation with the
existing literature. We then suggest some policy implications of our results,
and we conclude with some avenues for extensions.
5.1 Related literature
There is a vast literature on speculative bubbles, and we review only some
general themes here.23 Part of the literature builds on the fact that some
information, e.g. relative to the value of fundamentals, is dispersed among
agents. Bubbles are then generated by adding some extra ingredients. Allen,
Morris and Postlewaite (1993), for example, show that bubbles may arise in
a nite setting with private information only if one introduces also ex-ante
ine¢ ciency, short sale constraints, and lack of common knowledge of agents
trades. Alternatively, bubbles may occur if agents have subjective (and thus
erroneous) views about how private information is distributed.24
Another stream of literature focuses on the e¤ects of purely mechanical
traders (De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann, 1990a) or of agents
who form their expectations about future prices simply by extrapolating
from past market trends (Cutler, Poterba and Summers, 1990 and De Long,
Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann, 1990b). In a phase of rising prices, how-
ever, these agents would expect the prices to increase with no bounds, and
so they would never understand to be in a bubble nor that the market may
crash. As emphasized in the Introduction, we instead focus on agents with
23For a more detailed review, see Bianchi (2007).
24This line of reasoning, however, raises the issue of where subjective priors come from,
and why they survive in equilibrium. (see Dekel, Fudenberg and Levine, 2004, for a
critique of the learning foundations of Nash equilibria with subjective priors.)
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enough sophistication to understand that they are in a bubble and that the
market must crash.
Moreover, di¤erently from our approach, the literature has typically
modeled bubbles and crashes separately. For example, Gennotte and Leland
(1990) focus on the role of hedge funds in provoking the crash while taking as
given the fact that the market is overvalued; and Abreu and Brunnermeier
(2003) focus on how coordination issues among rational arbitrageurs may
delay the crash while abstracting from the underlying process generating
the bubble. On the other hand, De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann
(1990b) explain how feedback trading can generate a bubble but exogenously
impose an end period at which the crash occurs; and Scheinkman and Xiong
(2003) show how overcondence can sustain speculative trade but do not
consider how the crash may occur.
Finally, by emphasizing cognitive heterogeneity, our work is related to
a wide literature on the limits to information processing. (see in particular
Higgins, 1996 for an exposition of the idea of accessibility in psychology,
and Kahneman, 2003 for economic applications.)25 In particular, our idea
of equilibrium follows very closely the spirit of Jehiel (2005) who assumes, in
the context of extensive form games, that each player i is characterized by
a partition of the set of nodes where other players move, where each subset
of nodes is called analogy class. Player i assesses only the average behavior
of his opponents within each analogy class, and expects this same average
behavior to be played at each node within the analogy class. A related idea
is developed in static games of incomplete information by Eyster and Rabin
(2005).
5.2 Information and market e¢ ciency
As already emphasized in the Introduction, our approach di¤ers from a large
part of the literature on bubbles as it considers a setting with complete infor-
mation in which bubbles arise as some people face limitations in processing
all the relevant aspects of such information. One implication of our analysis
is that information availability per se need not lead to market e¢ ciency. In-
stead, we point out that information accessibility -which focuses on whether
information is presented in a way to ease its interpretation- should matter
as well. In this sense, the quest for market stability may require considering
issues of simplicity of information, or even of information overload, rather
than just increasing the amount of potentially available information.
Along the line of our analysis, one could even argue that some news may
have a destabilizing e¤ect, as they may lead partially sophisticated investors
25These themes are part of the economics literature at least since Herbert Simon (1955),
and they have been recently explored also in the study of strategic interactions (see Ru-
binstein, 1998 and the references therein and Jehiel, 1995; Jehiel, 2005; Jehiel and Samet,
2007), and of nancial markets (see Hirshleifer, 2001).
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to get excessively excited, thereby feeding the bubble phenomenon. This is
in a sense what happens within our model when unexpected increases in
the price lead partially sophisticated investors to overestimate the duration
of the bubble and stay invested for too long. If these investors ignored the
news, and in particular the realized price, they would stay invested less long
and so leave less room for bubbles. Information accessibility and news-driven
euphoria may be useful starting points also for exploring the role of media
in stimulating or undermining a speculative phenomenon.26
5.3 Rational investors and market e¢ ciency
A classic proposition views market e¢ ciency as the result of rational arbi-
trageursstrategies. However, several models, apart from the present one,
show that rational agents need not have the incentive to immediately stabi-
lize the market. These include Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) and De Long
et al. (1990b). These two models di¤er in their predictions. In Abreu and
Brunnermeier (2003), increasing the share of rational agents reduces the
maximal bubble as it reduces the buying capacity of irrational agents. Con-
versely, in De Long et al. (1990b), increasing the share of rational agents
increases the size of the bubble as it further distorts irrational agentsex-
pectations.
By contrast, in our model, the relation between the maximal bubble and
the share of rational investors can go both ways, and it depends crucially
on investors attitudes towards uncertainty. If investors disregard uncer-
tainty, increasing the share of rational investors makes irrational traders
less optimistic and induces rational investors to exit earlier, which reduces
the maximal bubble (see Proposition 4). Conversely, in a setting with un-
certainty averse agents, speculative investments increase with the share of
rational investors, who face less uncertainty, and such an increase makes
irrational traders more optimistic and it may then allow for longer bubbles
(see Section 4.3).
Hence, in our setting, rational investors are not necessarily a stabilizing
force. Instead, market e¢ ciency would be achieved by increasing the frac-
tion of people who admit that their predictions can be imprecise, and that
apparently strange observations may not be the result of chance, but rather
of a wrong model.
5.4 Extensions and future research
While we have described a world with only two cognitive types, a natural
extension would be to enrich the range of cognitive types. There are many
ways this could be done and we will review only a few ideas here.
26The strong relation between media coverage and abnormal returns has been recently
documented e.g. by Dyck and Zingales (2003) and Veldkamp (2006).
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First, we could consider the case of investors who distinguish a bit be-
tween the various phases of the bubble, thereby further di¤erentiating in-
vestors by how many phases they consider. Apart from generalizing our
results, this exercise might generate additional predictions, for example by
revealing that the order of exit from the speculative market need not be
monotonic in the degree of sophistication (how many phases are distin-
guished). Perhaps also, some agents may decide to re-enter the speculative
market after having exited, creating a richer (and possibly more compli-
cated) set of trading behaviors.27
Second, we could introduce agents who consider di¤erent aggregate sta-
tistics from the data. Instead of average investment strategies, investors
could consider for example average price changes along the bubble, average
prices at the peak of the bubble, average durations of a bubble. For some of
these aggregate statistics, bubbles are less likely to arise.28 We view a more
systematic exploration on which kind of aggregate statistics is likely to give
rise to speculative phenomena as an important direction for future research.
27 In fact, the threshold property that characterizes optimal strategies in our main analy-
sis (see Lemma 1 and Section 7.1) would hold within each phase that agents distinguish,
not necessarily for the entire duration of the market.
28For example, if investors only knew the average T in the past bubbles, the bubble
would not arise by standard backward induction arguments. In fact, since our model
is completely deterministic, knowing the duration of past bubbles would be enough to
perfectly predict the duration of the current bubble. In a less literal (and more realistic)
interpretation of our model, however, each bubble may be somewhat di¤erent from the
previous ones, as described for example by a di¤erent realization of a stochastic element
(K, r and z). In such world, having a correct understanding of other investorsstrategies,
as opposed to simply knowing the realizations of T; would provide a much more useful
information about the dynamics of the current bubble.
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6 Omitted proofs
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Notice rst that if agent i 2  exits from the market at t; then he must
expect the price to drop at t+ 1, i.e. p;tt+1 < p
;t
t , otherwise he would rather
exit at t + 1. By equation (5), and the discussion thereafter, if p;tt+1 < p
;t
t
then K;tt+2 = 0; so this agent expects the market to close at t+2. R-agents
expectations are correct, so the price indeed drops at t+ 1 and the market
closes at t+ 2. Hence, these agents will not re-enter at t+ 1. Now consider
I-agents. By equation (2), pI;tt+1 < p
I;t
t is equivalent to B
I;t
t+1 < S
I;t
t+1; which,
given equation (11), writes as KI;tt+1 < (1 K): By equation (5), we have
KI;tt+1 =
Kt  minfKt; (1 K)g; so pI;tt+1 < pI;tt is equivalent to
Kt <
(1 K)(1 + )
2
:
Now, since Kt cannot increase over time, it must be that
Ks <
(1 K)(1 + )
2
for every s  t:
This implies that, at any s  t; I-agents expect the price to drop at s + 1
and the market to close at s+ 2. Hence, such agents will never enter again.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
If agent i 2  expects p;tt+1  p;tt he will buy at t since the strategy of buying
at t and selling at t + 1 gives a positive expected prot. Notice that, for
this reason, the proposed strategy is optimal even though the agent may
be hit by a liquidity shock which forces him to sell at t + 1. Conversely,
if p;tt+1 < p
;t
t ; then B
;t
t+1 < S
;t
t+1. By equation (5), this implies K
;t
t+2 = 0;
so the agent expects the market to close at t + 2. Hence, given that the
agent expects that selling at t + 1 would be unprotable and selling after
t + 2 would be impossible, he does not buy at t. Hence, p;tt+1  p;tt is also
necessary for i 2  to buy/stay in the market at t. Finally, as already noted
in (2), equations (12) and (13) are equivalent.
6.3 Proof of Corollary 1
According to equation (11), condition (13) can be written as
KI;tt+1  (1 K); (25)
where by (5) we have KI;tt+1 = Kt minfKt; (1 K)g: If Kt < (1 K);
the agent would expect the price to drop at t and he would exit. This
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corresponds to condition (14), since (1 K)= < W and so Kt < (1 K)
implies Kt < W . If instead Kt  (1 K); then KI;tt+1 = Kt   (1 K):
Substituting into (25) gives the result.
6.4 The conditions dening T
In order to express conditions (20), (21) and (22) in terms of our exogenous
parameters, notice rst that, iterating equation (5), the amount of potential
buyers in period s can be written as the di¤erence between the initial amount
of potential buyersK and the accumulated amount of exits up to period s 1,
that is
Ks = K  
t=s 1X
t=1
[Vt + (1  t)Kt]: (26)
The volumes of trade induced by the bubble equilibrium are
Vt =
8<:
z(1 K) for t  T   1;
z(1 K)(1  r) + (1 K)r for t = T;
0 for t = T + 1:
(27)
Hence, using equations (16), (26), (27) and rearranging terms, we get
KT = K   z(1 K)(T   1);
and
KT+1 = (1  r)[K   z(1 K)T ]  r(1 K):
Condition (20) requires TKT  T (1 K): With simple algebra, it can be
written as
T  K   r
z(1 K)(1  r)  T1:
We then turn to conditions (21) and (22). To see their structure, we rst
dene the functions
F (T )  K   z(1 K)(T   1);
and
G(T )  (1  r)[K   z(1 K)T ]  r(1 K);
where by construction F (T ) = KT and G(T ) = KT+1: Notice that these
functions are decreasing in T and they both tend to minus innity as T goes
to innity. Furthermore, with simple algebra, one can show that the function
W (T ); as dened in equation (15) and in which  and  are given by (18)
and (19), is decreasing and convex in T; and that it tends to 2z(1 K) as T
goes to innity.29 Hence, both F (T ) and G(T ) can intersect W (T ) at most
twice in R+.
29Being only algebra, the proof is omitted.
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Suppose indeed that both F (T ) and G(T ) intersect W (T ) twice. Let
T5 and T2 be the roots solving F (T5) = W (T5) and F (T2) = W (T2), with
T5 < T2; and similarly let T4 and T3 be the roots solving G(T4) = W (T4)
and G(T3) =W (T3), with T4 < T3. Since G(T ) < F (T ) for every T; we then
have that T2 > T3 > T4 > T5: In this case, the bubble equilibrium writes as
T 2 [T5; T4) [ (T3; Tmax]; where Tmax  minfT1; T2g:
The possibility of two disjoint intervals dening the bubble equilibrium
depends on the fact that, in our model, both the amount of potential buyers
at T and I-agentsexpectations depend on T , as expressed by the functions
F (T ), G(T ) and W (T ). If F (T ) and G(T ) were constant (i.e. if z were
zero), then we would only have equilibria of the type [T5; T4): According to
condition (21), we would need T  T5 in order to make I-agents expec-
tations su¢ ciently optimistic and induce them to buy (recall that W (T ) is
decreasing, i.e. I-agentsoptimism increases in T ). On the other hand, con-
dition (22) would require T < T4 : R-agents could not sell too late otherwise
I-agentsexpectations would be too optimistic and they would never sell, so
the crash would not occur.
Conversely, if W (T ) were constant, we would only have equilibria of the
type (T3; Tmax]: Condition (21) would require that T  T2: If R-agents sell
too late, I-agents would not buy since the amount of cash observed at that
stage would be too low. On the other hand, condition (22) requires T > T3:
If R-agents sell too early, I-agents would not exit at T + 1, so the crash
would not occur. Hence, it would be optimal to stay in the market rather
than selling at T .
As one expects, equilibria of the type [T5; T4) occur when F (T ) and
G(T ) are very high, so the binding constraint is the evolution of I-agents
expectations; while equilibria of the type (T3; Tmax] occur when F (T ) and
G(T ) are very low, so the binding constraint is the evolution the amount of
cash observed in the economy. Indeed, for K su¢ ciently high, equilibria of
the type [T5; T4) do not exist, since we have T4 < 1 (as in Example 3.2.1).
More generally, depending on the value of K, r and z, such T2; T3; T4; T5
may not exist or their value may be less than one. This means that the
constraints dened above may or may not bind.
Rather than providing a full treatment of such T2; T3; T4; T5, our analysis
was mainly interested in dening conditions for the existence of equilibrium
bubble (as expressed in Proposition 3 and in Section 4.1) and in character-
izing the comparative statics on the maximal equilibrium bubble Tmax (as
expressed in Proposition 4 and in Section 4.3).
6.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Notice rst that, for every K, z and r; we have T3 < Tmax  minfT1; T2g:
In fact, since G(T ) < F (T ) for every T , we have that T3 < T2: Moreover,
by denition, G(T1) = 0; so condition (22) holds for sure at T1 and then
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T3 < T1: Given the shape of the function W (T ) described in Section 6.4,
the bubble equilibrium exists if and only if W (T ) and F (T ) intersect at
least once, i.e. if there exists a T2  1 such that F (T2) = W (T2): In fact,
when this is the case, Tmax can always be sustained as equilibrium. Hence,
a su¢ cient condition for the existence of a bubble equilibrium is that W (T )
and F (T ) intersect once and only once, that is the case when K  W (1):
With some algebra, one writes
K W (1)() K  [z(1 K)(1  r) + (1 K)(1 + r)](3  r)
(1  r)2 : (28)
Condition (28) can be rearranged to dene a K such that if K  K then
K  W (1); and so a bubble equilibrium exists. Moreover, one can see that
such K is always smaller than one, and it increases in r and z.30
6.6 The conditions dening Tmax
We now turn to the analysis of the conditions under which T1 or T2 denes
Tmax  minfT1; T2g: Notice rst that T1 < T2 if and only if W (T1) < F (T1):
By denition of T1; F (T1)(1 r) = ST and ST = z(1 K)(1 r)+r(1 K);
so W (T1) < F (T1) writes
z(1 K)(1  r) + r(1 K)
1  r > W (T1): (29)
In Section 3.3, we claimed that Tmax = T2 when r is small; and Tmax = T1
when z or K are small: We now show that this is indeed the case. Consider
the rst claim. Rearranging condition (29), we can dene a threshold r such
that T1 < T2 if and only if r > r: Such threshold is implicitly dened by
r = P (r); where
P (r)  W (T1)  z(1 K)
W (T1) + (1  z)(1 K) : (30)
In fact, P (r) is increasing inW (T1); andW (T1) is increasing in r. Moreover,
P (0) > 0 and P (1) < 1: Hence r > P (r) holds for r > r; where r is uniquely
dened by r = P (r):
Now consider the case of z ! 0; i.e. the probability of liquidity shocks
is very small. Both T1 and T2 tend to innity as z tends to zero, but T2
exceeds T1. In fact if z ! 0; then z(1 K)! 0; T1 !1 and W (T1)! 0:
Hence, P (r)! 0; so r always exceeds P (r) and Tmax = T1.
Finally, consider the conditions on K: Condition (29) can be rearranged
as
K <
r + (1  r)[z  W (T1)]
z(1  r) + r  Q(K):
30Equation (28) can alternatively be rearranged to dene a r and a z such that if
r  r or if z  z, then a bubble equilibrium exists.
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Notice rst that if K = 1; then W (T1) = 0 and so Q(1) = 1: That is, if
K = 1; then T1 = T2. For K = 0, no bubble equilibrium exists, so we only
have to consider K  Kmin, where Kmin corresponds to the case T1 = 1 and
it writes as
Kmin  r + z(1  r)
1 + z(1  r) :
Now, it can be shown (with simple algebra) that Q(Kmin) > Kmin; which
means that T1 < T2 for K = Kmin:
6.7 Proof of Proposition 4
By di¤erentiating equation T1 = (K  r)=[z(1 K)(1  r)], one sees that T1
increases in K and decreases with z and r: To see the e¤ects on T2, dene the
function L(T )  F (T ) W (T ): By denition, L(T2)  0: Di¤erentiating the
function L(T ); one can see that it decreases in T2; z and r and it increases in
K: Hence, by the implicit function theorem, T2 increases in K and decreases
with z and r. The second part of the Proposition can be shown by noticing
that if K ! 1 or z ! 0; then z(1 K)! 0: Both T1 and T2 tend to innity
as z(1 K)! 0:
6.8 Proof of Proposition 6
Condition (24) writes KT+1 < (1 K). Recall that condition (21) requires
KI;TT+1  (1 K): Hence, conditions (24) and (21) jointly require KT+1 <
KI;TT+1: Recall that KT+1 = TKT   ST , and KI;TT+1 = KT   (1   K):
Hence, KT+1 < K
I;T
T+1 if and only if
(T   )KT + [(1 K)  ST ] < 0: (31)
Consider the rst term in (31). Recall that T = (1 r) and  = (T r)=(T+
1); so T <  requires (T +1)(1 r) < (T  r); that is rT > 1: Now consider
the second term in equation (31). Recall that  = ((T   r)z+1+ r)=(T +1)
and ST = r(1   K) + z(1   K)(1   r): Hence, (1   K) < ST requires
r(1 K) z(1 K)Tr > 1 K z(1 K), that is rT > 1: Hence, condition
(31) is satised if and only if rT > 1: In particular, recall that we must have
T  T1; where T1 = (K   r)=[z(1   K)(1   r)]; so condition (31) requires
r > [z(1   K)(1   r)]=(K   r): Doing the algebra, the last inequality is
satised for r 2 (r1; r2); where r1 > 0. Hence, there exists a rmin > r1 > 0
such that if r  rmin condition (31) cannot hold:
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7 Generalization of our results
7.1 Exit and re-entry
In Section 2, we assumed that all exits are permanent and that this is cor-
rectly understood by each agent. We now show that, under a natural as-
sumption on I-agentsexpectations, this is indeed the only relevant case to
consider. Dene  as the fraction of exits that I-agents consider as perma-
nent. Similarly to the expectations on buy and sell rates  and ,  does
not depend on the calendar time t; but it need to correspond to the actual
average rate observed along the equilibrium. The evolution of Kt is then
expected to be
KI;tt+1 = Kt   EI;tt ; (32)
where recall that, by denition (3),
EI;tt = min(B
I;t
t ; S
I;t
t ) + (1  )KI;tt :
If I-agents sell at t; then it must be that pI;tt+1 < p
I;t
t , as otherwise they
would prefer selling at t + 1, and so KI;tt+1 < (1   K): Since KI;tt+1 =
Kt    [minfKt; (1 K)g+ (1  )Kt]; then it must be that
Kt <
(1 K)(1 +  )
[1  (1  ] :
Since Kt cannot increase with t, then it must be that p
I;s
s+1 < p
I;s
s for every
s > t, so I-agents will never buy again. Now consider R-agents. As for I-
agents, if they sell at t; then it must be that pt+1 < pt, and so Bt+1 < St+1: If
they re-enter at t+ 1, then Bt+1 < St+1 implies that I-investors are selling.
However, given that I-investors do not re-enter, no one will be willing to
buy from t+2 on, so it is not optimal for R-investors to re-enter. The same
argument can be replicated in any subsequent period. Hence, since no one
re-enters after having exited, the only consistent expectation is  = 1: This
is indeed the case considered in our previous analysis.
7.2 Uncertainty aversion
While Section 4.3 only considered the special case of z ! 0; we now analyze
the setting with uncertainty averse agents more generally. We want to char-
acterize how in this setting the maximal sustainable bubble varies with the
share of rational investors. First, as in equation (21), L-investors buy/stay
in at t if and only if Kt W; while H-investors buy/stay in at t if and only
if Kt W ("); where
W (")  (1 K)( + ")(1 +
   ") 
   "2 :
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We can see thatW (") increases in "; henceH-investors will always sell before
L-investors.31 We want to dene an equilibrium where H-investors sell at
some ~T ; fully rational investors sell at T > ~T ; and L-investors sell at T + 1:
Hence, buy and sell rates are respectively
t =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1 for t < ~T
1  (1  r)h for t = ~T
1 for t 2 ( ~T ; T )
1  r1 h(1 r) for t = T
0 for t = T + 1;
and
t =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
z for t < ~T
z + (1  z)(1  r)h for t = ~T
z for t 2 ( ~T ; T )
z + (1  z) r1 h(1 r) for t = T
1 for t = T + 1:
That is, for t < ~T no investor wants to exit, so the volume of trade is given
by liquidity shocks only, occurring with probability z. At ~T ; high ambiguity
averse agents, with mass (1   r)h, leave the speculative market, selling to
rational agents R and to low ambiguity averse agents L.32 For t 2 ( ~T ; T )
everyone in the market is willing to invest, as H-agents have left and they
are not considered anymore. At T; rational investors exit speculation, selling
to L-agents. At T +1; L-agents realize that the crash is about to occur and
they want to sell, while no one is willing to buy. The crash occurs and the
market closes.
We can then replicate the analysis of Section 3, computing the average
buy and sell rates induced by this equilibrium, and dening the maximal
bubble Tmax: We are interested in how Tmax varies with r; for a given pro-
portion of ambiguity averse agents h.33 In order to simplify the exposition,
from now on we assume that H-investors perceive enough uncertainty to be
31W (") is simply obtained from (21) by replacing  with    "; and  with  + ".
32Since the distribution of reservation prices, cognitive type and probability of liquidity
shock are all independent, the proportion of R and L in the speculative market remains
constant until T . Hence, for t 2 ( ~T ; T ); the proportion of R-investors in the market is
r
r + (1  h)(1  r) ;
and, similarly, the proportion of L-agents is
(1  r)(1  h)
r + (1  h)(1  r) :
33The e¤ect of h is clear: Tmax decreases with h; that is the fraction of people leaving
the market early.
30
induced to sell immediately, i.e. that " is large enough to have ~T = 1:34
In addition to the e¤ects already explored Section 3, which lead Tmax to
decrease with r, we now have to consider that the proportion of ambiguity
averse investors H decreases in r: This has a series of direct and indirect
e¤ects, making it possible that Tmax increases in r.
7.2.1 The e¤ects on T1
Recall that T1 is dened by BT = ST : In our equilibrium, ST includes all
R-investors with stocks at T and the exogenous sales z(1   K), while BT
includes all L-investors with cash at T . That is, ST = t(1 K); where
t = z + (1  z) r
1  h(1  r) ;
and BT = tKT ; where
t =
(1  r)(1  h)
1  h(1  r) ;
and
KT = K  z(1 K)(T  1)  (1  r)h[(1  z)(1 K)+K  z(1 K)( ~T  1)]:
Hence, BT  ST denes the condition T  T1; where:
T1  1
z(1 K) [K + z(1 K)  (1  z + zK)(1  r)h
  z(1 K)  hz(1 K)(1  r)  (1  z)(1 K)r
(1  r)(1  h) ]: (33)
After simple algebra, we can see that
@T1
@r
=
1
z(1 K) [h(1  z + zK) 
1 K
(1  r)2(1  h) ]; (34)
which is positive when
r  1 
s
1 K
h(1  h)(1  z + zK) : (35)
Proposition 7 claims that if z ! 0, then Tmax increases in r for every r  r^;
where
r^  1 
s
1 K
h(1  h) :
34For example H-investors may think that t and t are respectively drawn by dis-
tributions with mean  and  and support on [0; 1]. As they are extremely ambiguity
adverse, they assume t = 0 and t = 1 for all t, so they exit as soon as possible. In other
words, given that there is a one-to-one mapping between ~T and "; we now consider ~T as
an exogenous parameter of the model.
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To see that, notice rst that Tmax = T1 when z ! 0: In fact, one can
replicate the analysis of Section 6.6 in the setting with ambiguity aversion
and write that T1 < T2 if and only if r exceeds a threshold implicitly dened
by
r >
(1  h)[W (T1)  z(1 K)]
(1  h)[W (T1)  z(1 K)] + 1 K :
If z ! 0 the right hand side of the last equation tends to zero, and so
T1 < T2: Substituting z = 0 it into equation (35) gives the result.
7.2.2 The e¤ects on T2
Recall that T2 is dened as the latest period in which I-investors believe
it is protable to enter the speculative market. Hence, T2 is dened by
the amount of available cash observed in the economy and by I-investors
expectations about future buy and sell rates. In Section 3, T2 unambiguously
decreased in r as an higher r made expectations more pessimistic, i.e. it
increased W . Again, this need not hold now since, by changing r; we also
a¤ect the mass H of cautious investors who exit the market immediately.
The e¤ects on T2 are two. First, as already mentioned, the amount of
available cash KT increases in r. Hence, by this e¤ect, an higher r pushes
towards a larger T2: Second, an higher r inuences L-agentsexpectations,
as dened in W: By decreasing H, it pushes towards more optimistic expec-
tations, i.e. it decreases W: In addition, decreasing H has an indirect e¤ect.
Given that exits are perceived in relation to the amount of people still in
the market, a lower H increases the amount of people in the market at T ,
hence making the exit of rational agents appear smaller. Hence, this may
also induce more optimistic expectations and greater T2: We then have the
following Proposition.
Proposition 8 Let
~r  1
h
[
r
1  h
h
  (1  h)]:
Then,
@T2
@r
> 0;
when either (i) r  ~r or (ii) z ! 0 hold:
Proof. Recall that W decreases in  and increases in . The average
buy and sell rates induced in this equilibrium are
 =
1
T + 1
[T   (1  r)h  r
1  h(1  r) ]; (36)
and
 =
1
T + 1
f1 + zT + (1  z)[(1  r)h+ r
1  h(1  r) ]g: (37)
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Observing equations (36) and (37), we can see that
@ 
@r
> 0() @
@r
[(1  r)h+ r
1  h(1  r) ] < 0()
@
@r
< 0;
and hence
@W
@r
< 0() @
@r
[(1  r)h+ r
1  h(1  r) ] < 0: (38)
Condition (38) requires
 h+ 1  h
[1  h(1  r)]2 < 0;
which writes
r >
1
h
[
r
1  h
h
  (1  h)]  ~r(h): (39)
Hence, if r  ~r then an increase in r unambiguously increases T2; since it
increases KT and decreases W: This proves condition (i).
If r < ~r instead, the e¤ect is ambiguous, as both KT and W increase.
What matters is then the magnitude of the two e¤ects. The marginal e¤ect
on KT ; which tends to increase T2; is h[1  z(1 K)]. The marginal e¤ect
on W is small when T is large, i.e. when z(1   K) is small. In fact, as
z(1  K) ! 0; T2 ! 1;  ! 1;  ! 0: Moreover, di¤erentiating W with
respect to r; we see that
@W
@r
! 2(1 K)
T + 1
f h+ 1  h
[1  h(1  r)]2 g; as T !1;
so @W=@r ! 0 as z(1 K)! 0: Hence, the e¤ect on KT always dominates
for su¢ ciently small values of z: That is, T2 increases in r when z ! 0;
which is condition (ii).
7.2.3 The general case
The results in the previous Subsections may not be su¢ cient for determining
how Tmax varies with r. In fact, it may be that T1 is the binding constraint
for r > ~r and T2 is binding for r < r^. One way to show that Tmax may
increase with r irrespective on whether T1 or T2 binds is to choose an r
within the interval [~r; r^]; provided this is not empty. With some algebra,
one can see that r^ always exceeds ~r when K is su¢ ciently close to 1:35
Hence, the previous conditions can be jointly satised, and they dene a set
of su¢ cient conditions such that the maximal sustainable bubble is locally
increasing in r: In sum, we have that if r 2 [~r; r^]; then
@Tmax
@r
> 0:
35More precisely, we require K  1   (1  X)(1   y)2y2; where y 2 (0; 1) is dened as
y =
p
(1  h)=h:
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